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Abstract
We analyze the claims that video recreations of shoulder surfing attacks offer a suitable alternative
and a baseline, as compared to evaluation in a live setting. We recreated a subset of the factors of a prior
video-simulation experiment conducted by Aviv et al. (ACSAC 2017), and model the same scenario
using live participants (n = 36) instead (i.e., the victim and attacker were both present). The live
experiment confirmed that for Android’s graphical patterns video simulation is consistent with the live
setting for attacker success rates. However, both 4- and 6-digit PINs demonstrate statistically significant
differences in attacker performance, with live attackers performing as much 1.9x better than in the video
simulation. The security benefits gained from removing feedback lines in Android’s graphical patterns are
also greatly diminished in the live setting, particularly under multiple attacker observations, but overall,
the data suggests that video recreations can provide a suitable baseline measure for attacker success rate.
However, we caution that researchers should consider that these baselines may greatly underestimate the
threat of an attacker in live settings.
1 Introduction
Biometric authentication mechanisms offer considerable promise to smartphone users. However, the protec-
tion of unlock authentication still relies on choosing hard to guess passcodes (e.g., PINs and unlock patterns),
while not revealing those passcodes to untrusted parties. A common means of attack for gaining access to the
passcode is via shoulder surfing. In a shoulder surfing attack, an observer attempts to view a victim in the
process of entering his/her passcode with the intention of recreating that passcode after gaining possession
of the device [26].
The area of shoulder surfing has been the subject of a great deal of work [10, 12, 19, 8, 6, 7, 9, 18, 13, 4], for
both understanding the threat and proposing mechanisms to prevent it. Of particular relevance to this study
(termed ”current study”), is the work conducted by Aviv et al. [4] (termed: ”prior study”). The prior study
examined the shoulder surfing susceptibility of three commonly used unlock authentication mechanisms:
4- and 6-digit PINs, 4- and 6-length Android graphical patterns, and 4- and 6-length Android graphical
patterns with the feedback display turned off (lines rendered by the interface between grid points as they are
touched by the user). Due to the difficult nature of evaluating shoulder surfing attacks in the field, the goal
of the prior study was to establish baselines for shoulder surfing vulnerability in controlled settings that can
be used to compare across authentication types and used as baseline for evaluating authentication systems
that are designed to defend against such attacks.
To control the analysis, the prior study was conducted using a video-based methodology where the
researchers recorded a set of videos with highly controlled factors and then asked participants to view
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these videos as a simulated shoulder surfing scenario. The data was analyzed to determine shoulder-surfing
susceptibility under each condition. The attack rate (how effectively the participant could recall the passcode
entered in the video) was the primary metric.
In this paper, we seek to compare the video-based methodology to a similarly controlled live setting. In
particular, we are interested in assessing the prior work’s following findings relating to the attack success
rate.
• Longer authentication lengths (e.g, 4-digit vs. 6-digit PINs) are less vulnerable.
• PIN authentication is less vulnerable to the attack compared to patterns with and without feedback
lines.
• Removing the feedback lines from patterns decreases the vulnerability to shoulder surfing.
• Multiple observations increases vulnerability.
• Video based evaluation provides a baseline for live, in-person shoulder surfing vulnerability.
Using the raw results of the prior study, we compare the attacker success rates of the live setting to
a comparable subset of the video study data. Testing for differences in proportionality, we are unable to
reject the null hypothesis that the attacker success rate are the same for Android patterns as well as in
many of the settings with patterns without feedback lines. This suggests that there is consistency between
the results of the video and live simulations. However, the advantage of removing feedback lines previously
observed in video simulation is considerably lessened in the live setting. For PINs, we observe significant
difference between the video and the live settings, where live attackers performed up to 1.9x better in some
scenarios. Stereo vision seems to greatly improve the reliability of recalling the more complex motions of
entering a PIN. Despite this discrepancy, the claim of Aviv et al. of these results forming a baseline is still
supported: we never observed a situation by which the live simulation performed worse than a video study
when significant differences exist.
We conclude that video studies do provide a reasonable approximation for live simulation of shoulder
surfing in settings that involve graphical passwords (but not PINs), like the Android password pattern,
and at least a lower-bound on the attack success rate for all tested authentication types (including PINs).
However, researchers should consider that this lower-bound may be a significant underestimation compared
to the true attack rate in live simulations.
2 Related Work
Mobile authentication and observation attacks Threats such as shoulder-surfing attacks have been
well documented by researchers [27, 4]. Studies have been conducted examining experiences of users who had
encountered observation attacks [11] where shoulder surfing was found to be “casual” and “opportunistic.”
Harbach et al. [14] found that participants only very rarely reported shoulder surfing (0.3% of 1134 sampled
events) as an immediate high risk threat when authenticating.
In order to minimize the risk associated with observation attacks, users are known to modify their own
usage behaviors when using a mobile device, hiding the device from sight and performing mobile interactions
in the pocket or bag, or even shielding the screen [1]. Solutions also exist to obscure screens from third
parties [8], to detect the presence of shoulder surfers in a nearby vicinity [20] or to deceive onlookers from
data being entered [24, 17]. Attacks have also been simulated by having observers watch video footage of
victims entering authentication sequences. Examples include [15] where attacks took place from top and
side views. A range of solutions have also been proposed to minimize the likelihood of shoulder-surfing when
entering authentication sequences [2]. However, as highlighted by Wiese and Roth [27], it can be difficult to
compare the efficacy of these solutions, as the ways in which these systems are studied varies. Furthermore,
the outcomes can be difficult to compare and interpret.
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Evaluating resistance from shoulder surfing Many evaluation studies have focused on observing un-
lock screen interactions where PINs and patterns are entered [22, 4, 15]. Wiese and Roth [27] suggest that
conducting such studies are challenging because real-world adversaries are not available for study and must
be simulated in one way or another. In contrast to live studies where participants and actors/researchers
perform tasks together in person, video simulations have been used to identify susceptibility of on-screen
threats [21, 2]. Video recordings offer consistency when presented to multiple users [27], and can also be ac-
cessed independent of location. However, research indicates that that the success of adversaries is lower when
performing video observations compared to live settings [23, 27]; we make a similar observation here. Prior
research also recommends that shoulder surfing attackers should be allowed a number of observations [27]
as well as viewing interactions from a range of views [21, 4] and different properties of passcodes [4]. Addi-
tionally, the hand position [22] and interaction style when entering data into the device [4] should also be
considered. We tested scenarios found to be significant in Aviv et al., following similar procedures.
Overview of Aviv et al. [4] Aviv et al. considered the lack of a baseline for comparing common unlock
authentication mechanisms under the threat of shoulder surfing. As a method of creating such a baseline, the
authors used a series of controlled video simulations of a victim entering unlock authentications using several
methods. These methods were PINs and Android’s graphical pattern unlock, with and without feedback
lines present. Additional factors were considered, including the angle of observation, number of observations,
the number of recreation attempts by the observer, the hand posture of the victim, phone size, and spatial
layout of the passcodes.
The methodology of that experiment was multi-factorial. Participants were selected into one of a number
of independent factors (phone type, passcode choice, authentication type, hand posture) and then a set
of randomized dependent factors (passcodes, observation angles, number of views, and attempts). For
recruitment, the primary results were based off participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 1173) and
participants recruited locally (n = 91), with both groups completing a web survey whereby they viewed
videos of authentication and attempted to recreate the passcodes observed.
Using the results, the authors tested the following hypotheses (the -p indicates a prior work hypothesis):
• H1-p: The type of unlock authentication, PIN pattern with lines, patterns without lines, affects the
shoulder surfing vulnerability.
• H2-p: Repeated viewing of user input increases the likelihood of a shoulder surfing vulnerability.
• H3-p: Multiple attempts to recreate the input affects the likelihood of a shoulder surfing vulnerability.
• H4-p: The angle of observations affects shoulder surfing vulnerability.
• H5-p: The properties of the unlock authentication, such as length and visual features, affect shoulder
surfing vulnerability.
• H6-p: The phone size affects shoulder surfing vulnerability.
• H7-p: The hand position used to hold and interact with a device affects shoulder surfing vulnerability.
Of those hypotheses, H1-p, H2-p, H3-p, H4-p, and H6-p were accepted, while H5-p was partially ac-
cepted, and H7-p was rejected. The authors claim that the video studies, generally, can form a reasonable
replacement for live simulation, and that at the very least a video study could provide a baseline for shoulder-
surfing vulnerability.
3 Methodology
To investigate the efficacy of video-based recreations for evaluating observation attacks, we recreated the
study conducted by Aviv et al. [4] with live participants in a controlled lab environment. We asked partic-
ipants to position themselves in similar locations to where the cameras were positioned in the prior study.
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They then attempted to shoulder-surf a victim (played by a proctor). We varied the type and length of
authentication sequences, observation angle, and number of repeated viewing attempts, to determine if these
factors impact the success of the attacker. The results were then compared with Aviv et al.’s findings using
a comparable subset of the prior data. For simplicity of discussion, we refer to the prior work of Aviv et al.
as the video study and the results here as the live study.
Hypotheses In particular, we are interested in testing the following hypothesis related to the efficacy of
video based shoulder surfing experiments as compared to live settings.
• H1-r: Live shoulder surfing confirms accepting prior hypotheses:
– H1-p: The authentication type affects shoulder surfing vulnerability
– H2-p: Repeated viewing affects shoulder surfing vulnerability
– H4-p: The angle of observation affects shoulder surfing vulnerability
– H5-p: The properties of the passcodes affects should surfing vulnerability
• H2-r: Video simulation forms a baseline of performance compared to live settings.
3.1 Study Design and Materials
Treatments The study followed a mixed factorial design, similar to the video study. Independent variables
included authentication type (PIN vs pattern) on the Nexus 5 device using the same hand posture/interaction
style (one-handed, right thumb input). For dependent variables, we reduced the observation angle to two
(left or right) as opposed to the five angles used in prior work. The video study used the variety of angles
to simulate different heights, but height variation is naturally present in a live study. We kept the same
variables for observations (single observation from one angle, two observations from the same angle, or two
observations from different angles), and we used a lab environment for our live study very similar to the
set-up to capture videos for the video study (Aviv et al.) (see Figure 1).
There were two notable differences between factors in the video study and the live study. First, we only
allowed each participant a single attempt at recreating the passcode. This choice was motivated by results
of the video study whereby participants, knowing they would have multiple attempts in advance, actually
did worse at the tasks than those that knowingly had one attempt. It was conjectured that participants
attempted to “game” the task knowing that they would have multiple attempts at recreating the passcode.
As such, we only allowed participants to make one recreation attempt, and this fact was communicated
during training.
Another difference in the live study was that passcode recreation occurred using pen-and-paper, as
opposed to a simulation of the device used in the video study. This choice was made to simplify the data
collection procedures for both proctors and participants.
Finally, as we only tested a subset of the treatments of the prior video study, we only performed our
analytic comparisons on a relevant subset of the video study data. In particular, we removed data that
included a top angle and reduced the two side angles into a single left or right setting. Additionally, as the
video cannot control for monitor display size, which was a large factor in the prior results, we only used
the most ideal viewing conditions, where the reported y-axis pixels were greater than 1800. We believe this
restriction provided the most fair comparisons possible given the potential uncontrolled factors. We discuss
limitations and realism further in Section 4.
Authentication types We analyzed three authentication types with two different length settings, as used
in the video study. These included:
• PIN: 4- or 6-length PINs consisting of a set of numbers.
• PAT: Android unlock patterns consisting of 4 or 6 contact points with the feedback lines present.
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Auth. id Patterns PINs
0 0145 1328
1 014763 153525
2 1346 159428
3 136785 1955
4 3157 366792
5 4572 441791
6 642580 458090
7 6745 5962
8 743521 6702
9 841257 7272
Table 1: Authentication identifiers for patterns and PINs. To the right, the numeric labeling for patterns to
contact points.
• NPAT: Android unlock patterns consisting of 4 or 6 contact points without the feedback lines present.
While the PIN interaction display is as one expects, the presence or absence of grid pattern feedback lines is
less well known. When a pattern is entered with feedback lines (PAT), the display will show connecting lines
on the screen between grid points touched by the user while entering their passcode shape. Alternatively,
the connecting lines are not rendered on screen during passcode entry in the without feedback lines (NPAT)
pattern display, although the user must still contact the appropriate points in the correct order. As identified
by Aviv et al. [4] and von Zezschwitz et al. [25], the absence of feedback lines can make it more difficult for
an observer to recreate the patterns. As part of H1-r, we will make a similar evaluation.
To maintain consistency, we used the same set of patterns and PINs as in prior work (Table 1 and
Appendix B.1). The patterns were selected from an online study of self-reported patterns [3], and the PINs
were obtained from sequences of digits in leaked password sets, similar to the analysis by Bonneau et al. [5].
Further, the set of passcodes were selected for physical properties, as the layout and sequence of gestures in
entry may affect shoulder surfing attack rate. The patterns’ spatial properties might affect surfing attacks
because an attacker’s view from some viewing angles might be obscured for some parts of the touchscreen.
Randomization and counterbalancing One of the restrictions for performing the study using live
participants as compared to video recreation is that the same level of randomization is nearly impractical
for the target recruitment size and the set of factors being considered. As such, we designed a two stage
randomization procedure, one for ordering the passcodes and one for ordering the observation angles.
In particular, Table 2 contains three different randomized orders across the passcode. These are labeled
Order a, b, and c. Note that the authentication identifiers refer to Table 1. In Table 3 are four randomized
orders for observation angles (i, ii, iii, and iv). For each participant, we randomly assigned them a passcode
order and an observation angle, producing 12 different randomizations.
At this point, it is important to consider counterbalancing. Selecting randomized orders for passcodes or
observations can weight the data improperly. This leads to an optimization problem, and we used a utility
function to find a set of randomized orders that would provide (1) sufficient data in each factor for us to
perform statistical tests, (2) a roughly equal ratio of data within each factor being compared (4- vs 6-length,
auth-type, angle), (3) that each passcode only appears once per viewing, and (4) that within each viewing
sequence, per participant, there are roughly an equal number of single and multiple observations. We found
a case that nearly met these criteria, as displayed in Table 2 and 3. The weighting is then displayed based
on 12 participants in Table 4, leaving us with 72 single-view observations and 48 multi-view observations,
24 from the same angle twice and 24 from two different angles. Additionally, there is equal weighting across
angles and viewing (Table 3), and nearly equal weighting across passcodes.
We acknowledge that this counterbalancing is not a perfect weighting, and solving this particular op-
timization problem is challenging and may not have a solution. However, the resulting counterbalancing
compares favorably to the subset of relevant video study data. For PINs, there is nearly an equal number
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Order Auth. id
a 8 1 0 7 9 2 6 5 4 3
b 0 6 3 8 2 4 9 7 1 5
c 6 0 9 4 8 3 5 1 7 2
Table 2: Orderings of the patterns and PINs in the experiments.
Exp. Angle(s)
i L R R RR L LR RL R L LL
ii RL L LR R LL R R L L RR
iii LL RR L R R L R LR RL L
iv LR R R L L RL RR L LL R
Table 3: Angles used within each experiment, including multiple views with two angles indicated. L=view
from left side, R=view from right side.
of observations in the one-view and two-view conditions. For PAT/NPAT, there is 50% less observations in
one-view condition with a significant proportion necessary for statistical testing, and the two-view conditions
for PAT/NPAT are of the same magnitude as the video study (see Table 6).
In total, we were able to run complete trials for 18 participants each for PAT and NPAT, and all of those
36 participants also completed a PIN viewing. The order between PIN and PAT/NPAT for participants was
randomized, so that half of the participants completed a PIN trial before doing a PAT/NPAT trial, and the
other half completed the protocol in the reverse order, PAT/NPAT then PIN.
3.2 Live Simulation Setup and Coordination
We sought to recreate nearly the same scenario for shoulder surfing as the video study. Namely, we had our
victim placed in a sitting position with the participant observer behind the victim, either standing to the
right or the left, directed by one of two proctors. These were the same positions where the cameras were
located (near left and near right views) in the study by Aviv et al. [4]. See Figure 1 for a visual of this
arrangement for the live study.
Additionally, for the phone application used to enter the passcodes, we used the same mobile applications
as in the prior study, which includes a web-based platform for entering PINs and patterns. Screenshots of
those applications are provided in Figure 2.
For patterns with feedback lines, the white tracing lines would follow the user gesture, and once the
pattern was entered, it would remain visible on-screen for a half a second before disappearing. The same
would be true for the patterns without feedback lines, however, neither the tracing lines nor the contact
points of the grid would be rendered on the screen. For PINs, the layout allowed for numeric entry as
expected. Once digit keys were selected, the corresponding digits were presented on the interface. These
would then fade to a * after a half a second, similar to most mobile PIN entry interfaces.
For the participant observer to record their pattern entry, we used pen and paper. Examples of the
observer forms are provided in the Appendix (A.3). The forms had text boxes and mini-diagrams of the
application interfaces, so the participants could easily record the observed entry. Participants were asked
not to write down the passcodes observed until directed following all observations, which was important for
the multiple viewing scenario.
As shown in Figure 1, two pre-marked spots were placed on the floor to direct participants where to
stand on the left or right side. The second proctor, following the randomized treatment order, would call
out directions to the participant; for example, “one view, from the left” or “two views, first from left and
then right.” Once the participant was in place for each view, the second proctor would cue the first proctor
(playing the victim) to enter a passcode.
At this point, a significant challenge we had to overcome was how to prompt the victim-proctor with
the correct passcode to enter without tipping off the participant-observer. Due to the randomization pro-
cedures, requiring the victim-proctor to memorize the numerous orderings was not realistic. As a solution,
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Auth. id L R LL RR LR RL one two-same two-different
0 3 4 1 1 2 1 7 2 3
1 5 3 1 1 1 1 8 2 2
2 4 3 2 1 1 1 7 3 2
3 3 4 1 1 2 1 7 2 3
4 4 3 1 1 1 2 7 2 3
5 3 4 1 2 1 1 7 3 2
6 2 4 1 2 1 2 6 3 3
7 5 3 1 1 1 1 8 2 2
8 4 3 2 1 1 1 7 3 2
9 3 5 1 1 1 1 8 2 2
total 36 36 12 12 12 12 72 24 24
Table 4: Balancing of observation angles, number of views, for each authentication after 12 participants,
Order× Exp.
Figure 1: Experimental setup with an observer attacking a victim, a member of a research team. Note the
Google Glass displaying the passcode to enter.
we developed a Google Glass application to guide the victim-proctor through the various passcode orders.
Google Glass is a wearable eyeglass display unit that runs on a modified Android OS. It enables one to scroll
interactively through images projected onto a viewing screen built into the right eyepiece. Moreover, the
small display screen on the Google Glass was not visible to the participant. A screenshot of the Google Glass
application is provided in Figure 3.
3.3 Procedure
The replication experiment proceeded in four stages:
1. Informed Consent and Ante Hoc Questionnaire: All participants were properly informed and con-
sented, as we conducted an IRB approved experiment. Following consent, we asked participants to
complete an ante hoc questionnaire that covered basic demographic questions, such as age and gender,
as well as questions regarding the participants experience with smartphones, mobile authentication,
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Figure 2: Screenshots of the web-based applications used by the victim entering the passcode. Note, that
for the pattern without feedback lines setting, the white trace lines would not appear.
Figure 3: Screenshots of the Google Glass application as viewed by the victim and enter the correct PIN or
pattern.
and sense of risk from shoulder surfing. The subjective response questions were largely intended to
orient participants to physical security issues related to the study. The ante hoc questions are found
in the Appendix (A.1).
2. Training: Depending on the set of authentications being observed in the trial run, a training session
would include two basic passcodes, the L shape for patterns and the 1234 PIN, to help familiarize the
participant with the procedures, how to record on the observation sheets, and where to stand for the
trials (similar training was performed in the video study). Additional training on how to fill out the
observation form was also provided, which is included in the Appendix (A.3).
3. Trial: Under the direction of the proctor, the participant conducted 10 observations of either the PAT
or NPAT pattern entry, and 10 observations of PIN entry.
4. Post Hoc Questionnaire: Following the trials, the participant answered a series of post hoc questions
related to the challenge of the task and his/her perceived performance thereon. See Appendix A.2 for
the set of post hoc questions.
As each participant completed two trials, one for either PAT or NPAT and another for PIN, once the trial
stage was over for the first authentication we would return to training for the second authentication. As a
way to control for training effects, whereby observing PINs first could increase or decrease performance on
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Live Video
Male Female Total Male Female Neither Total
A
g
e
18-24 16 4 10 (27.8%) 30 9 0 39 (39.4%)
25-34 8 5 13 (36.1%) 24 10 1 34 (34.3%)
35-44 1 1 2 (5.6%) 10 4 0 14 (14.1%)
45-54 0 0 0 (0.0%) 4 3 0 7 (7.1%)
55-64 1 0 1 (2.8%) 1 0 0 1 (1.0%)
65+ 0 0 0 (0.0%) 1 2 0 3 (3.0%)
total 26 (72.2%) 10 (27.8%) 36 70 (70.7%) 28 (28.2%) 1 (1.0%) 99
P
h
o
n
e iOS 15 7 22
Android 9 2 11
Windows 2 0 2
U
n
lo
c
k
Fingerprint 15 6 21
PIN-6 8 5 13
PIN-4 10 2 12
Pattern 5 1 6
None 3 1 4
Table 5: Demographic, phone usage, and unlock authentication types of participants. For the video study,
the subset of comparable data that includes participants in both the “in-person” and “online” settings that
had screen resolution greater than 1800px and observed patterns on the Nexus 5 phone.
observing PAT/NPAT, we ensured that there was an even ratio between the order of the trials. A guide was
also followed to ensure that the researchers followed the same steps in the protocol (see Appendix A.4).
3.4 Recruitment
Participants were recruited from university student mailing lists, and paid $5 (USD). In total, we recruited 36
participants, including 10 females. The cohort was predominately aged between 18 to 24 years old. Almost
two-thirds of participants used iOS mobile devices. 21 used a fingerprint reader to unlock their phones, and
6 used patterns (we did not ask if feedback lines were turned off). The demographic breakdown, as well as
their choice in mobile device and authentication are presented in Table 5.
Additionally presented in Table 5 are the demographics of a comparable set of participants from the prior
video study; these participants observed authentication on the Nexus 5 phone in the “in-person” lab setup
or the on-line MTurk setup with a screen resolution of at least 1800px in the y-axis, the most realistic setting
of the prior work. The breakdown of these two groups are similar, slightly younger overall with about 70/30
gender breakdown.
4 Realism and Limitations
As described in the previous section, we attempted, as best as possible, to recreate the settings of the prior
video study in live simulation. Due to the complexities of performing such a process, the study described in
this paper had its own set of limitations.
Viewing angles While we use a similar lab environment for the live simulation to that used in the video
study, the participants could not stand in exactly the same position as the cameras due to height differences
and the relatively close proximity of the near and far angles from a given side. We thus reduced the
observations to simply left and right and relied on the fact that our participants naturally vary in height to
compensate for the near and far setting of camera height placement in the prior study.
Victim entry speed Another recreation challenge is that our victim (a proctor) must enter the authen-
tication sequence many times over at a consistent speed. Clearly, a video ensures consistency here, and so
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we trained the victim-proctor on the original videos to maintain consistent timings of authentication entry.
While there is no guarantee that every participant viewed the authentication at the same rate, we believe
this training, and the total number of entries performed by the victim, ensures consistency. Further, the
same victim-proctor was used in all data collection.
Subset of conditions As summarized in Section 3, a subset of the original conditions were used in the live
simulation. We kept factors that were shown to be significant in the video study, but also had to remove some
that posed usability challenges for the proctor acting as the victim. While the selection process was done
carefully to address conditions likely to be important, it was also done for a practical nature of conducting a
study with live participants as compared to online. To ensure that we made a fair comparison, we selected a
similar subset of the data from the prior study. In particular, we used results from the previous study from
participants who had viewing screens of at least 1800px across, who viewed authentication attempts via the
Nexus 5 phone with thumb input from the left or right side.
Pen-and-paper attacker recordings As participants were using pen-and-paper to record their observa-
tions during the shoulder surfing attack, some participants were able to use this as an added aid to support
recall of the passcodes. For example, some participants were viewed by the proctor mimicking the movements
made by the victim-proctor between multiple-view conditions prior to writing down their final observation.
While we directed participants to not do this during training, it was difficult to stop due to the nature of the
task. In the video study, participants were also directed not to use additional aids, such as writing down ob-
servations while observing the passcodes, and were required to attest to this. However, it is possible that the
attestations were not fully truthful, nor could the researchers verify this as the study was conducted online.
As such, as neither study could fully control for this we believe that this provides for a fair comparison.
Ecological validity Low levels of ecological validity are known to be commonplace among lab-based stud-
ies for mobile interactions [16]. Although the method and setting selected for our study cannot approximate
the conditions by which shoulder surfing may take place in-the-wild, we designed the study to provide a
sense of realism even in a lab-based environment (e.g. victim in seated position similar to attacks taking
place while seated on public transport, while seated in a classroom, etc.). However, due to time constraints,
conditions such as providing multiple attempts to observe and/or recreate entry, could not be examined.
Further study would be needed to widen the range of factors examined, and to identify the applicability of
these findings to other types of tasks (e.g. authenticating while ambulatory) or other types of settings (e.g.
field-based).
5 Results
As the live simulation used a subset of the variables in the video study (see prior section), we in turn
performed comparisons on an appropriate subset of the video study data. We used video data that met the
following criteria: one-handed/thumb-input on the Nexus 5 (red) phone, viewed from the left or right angle,
and a single recreation attempt. Additionally, we only included video data that was collected with a screen
resolution > 1800 pixels, which was identified as the most ideal viewing condition in the prior study [4].
With these reductions, we compared 720 shoulder surfing attempts for the live simulation to a comparable
1,171 attempts in the video study.
5.1 Comparing Attack Rates Across Video and Live Studies
Statistical Procedures As the results of the experiments for both the live and video study are propor-
tional, either the participant succeeded in recreating the passcode or did not, we compare the results using
a proportionality test for equality of proportions, which follows a χ2 distribution. That is, we compare the
attacker success rate for the video study to that of the live study using the same conditions, reporting the χ2
statistic, the two-tailed p value, and the 95% confidence interval (δ95) for the difference between proportions.
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One-View Two-Same Two-Different
Auth. Length Live Video Live Video Live Video
PAT
4-len
50/53=94.3% 106/111=95.5% 15/17=88.2% 24/27=88.9% 19/20=95.0% 62/68=91.2%
χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.10, 0.07] χ
2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.21, 0.19] χ
2 = 0.01, p = 0.93, δ95[−0.11, 0.19]
6-len
45/55=81.8% 74/95=77.9% 18/19=94.7% 23/24=95.8% 14/16=87.5% 78/84=92.9%
χ2 = 0.13, p = 0.72, δ95[−0.11, 0.19] χ
2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.15, 0.13] χ
2 = 0.05, p = 0.82, δ95[−0.26, 0.15]
NPAT
4-len
48/55=87.3% 74/104=71.2% 18/19=94.7% 17/20=85.0% 16/16=100.0% 49/61=80.3%
χ2 = 4.37, p = 0.04∗, δ95[0.02, 0.30] χ
2 = 0.22, p = 0.64, δ95[−0.14, 0.33] χ
2 = 2.38, p = 0.12, δ95[0.06, 0.34]
6-len
35/53=66.0% 58/101=57.4% 17/17=100.0% 15/24=62.5% 18/20=90.0% 56/78=71.8%
χ2 = 0.75, p = 0.39, δ95[−0.09, 0.26] χ
2 = 6.13, p = 0.01∗, δ95[0.13, 0.62] χ
2 = 1.95, p = 0.16, δ95[−0.01, 0.38]
PIN
4-len
89/111=80.2% 48/94=51.1% 32/33=97.0% 12/21=57.1% 34/36=94.4% 37/65=56.9%
χ2 = 18.17, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.16, 0.43] χ
2 = 10.98, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.14, 0.66] χ
2 = 13.88, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.21, 0.54]
6-len
46/105=43.8% 17/109=15.6% 25/39=64.1% 4/17=23.5% 31/36=86.1% 19/68=27.9%
χ2 = 19.16, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.16, 0.41] χ
2 = 6.27, p = 0.01∗, δ95[0.11, 0.70] χ
2 = 29.62, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.41, 0.76]
Table 6: Attacker accuracy results for the live experiment and the video experiment. The view type indicates
if the participant provides a single (or one) view or multiple views (two), either from the same angle or
different angles of observation. For the video study, only data where screen base resolution > 1800 with
left or right views (no top) was considered. A 2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity
correction was used, and the χ2 statistic, p-value, and 95% confidence interval (δ95) of the difference between
the proportions (live - video) are reported.
In the cases where p ≤ 0.05, we can conclude that the live study was not well modeled by the video study
because the proportions of attacker success are significantly different. Similarly if p > 0.05 we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the two proportions are the same and thus must conclude that the proportions are
more likely measuring the same effect. The confidence interval reports the most likely range of difference
between the attacker success rate for the video and live results, but is only relevant when a significant
difference is found.
When comparing data across factors with greater than two conditions, we used a χ2 test for goodness of
fit to determine significant differences in attack success rates. Post-hoc analysis is conducted using pairwise
comparisons with a Bonferonni correction.
Across tests, while the data is overlapping for some of the factors being examined, we do not normal-
ize/correct p values as we are not attempting to control for type-1 errors across all tests. Instead, we are
performing exploratory analysis and interested in determining if significant differences may exist and from
where they may arise. In post-hoc analysis, as described above, we do correct p values as appropriate as this
occurs within a single test with directly overlapping hypothesis.
Authentication Types (H1-r/H1-p) In the prior study, a key finding was that a statistical difference was
identified in attacker performance across authentication type. We can perform the same tests by comparing
vulnerability to shoulder surfing for the single view conditions; see the first column of Table 6.
We first compare each of the authentications between the video and the live study, irrespective of the
authentication length. For patterns with feedback lines (termed: PAT) (χ2 = 0.0, p = 1), there is strong
statistical similarity. However, for patterns without lines (termed: NPAT) (χ2 = 4.54, p = 0.03) we do see
a significant difference between the live and video study, and an even more prominent difference for PINs
(χ2 = 37.76, p = 0.00). Statistical differences for NPAT can be accounted for by an increase in the 4-length
performance for attackers in the live setting (see Table 6), and for PINs, we consistently see performance
increases for the live setting compared to the video setting. In this case, the success rate for PINs in the video
setting is 65/208=32.0% compared to 135/216=62.5% for the live setting, an increase of 1.95x; however, the
video study does provide a baseline.
We can also compare authentication types within collection method, as related to H1-p. Using a three-
way χ2 tests with pairwise comparisons, there are statistically significant differences between each of the
success rates for each of the authentications for both the live (χ2 = 24.8, p = 0.00) and video (χ2 =
133.4, p = 0.00) settings. The residuals suggest the leading cause of this difference is the increased difficulty
of shoulder surfing PINs, for both the video and live setting, but post-hoc, pairwise-analysis (with Bonferroni
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Left Right
Auth. Length Live Video Live Video
PAT
4-len
27/28=96.4% 47/49=95.9% 23/25=92.0% 59/62=95.2%
χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.09, 0.10] χ
2 = 0.00, p = 0.95, δ95[−0.18, 0.12]
6-len
22/26=84.6% 36/48=75.0% 23/29=79.3% 38/47=80.9%
χ2 = 0.44, p = 0.51, δ95[−0.12, 0.31] χ
2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.22, 0.19]
NPAT
4-len
23/29=79.3% 34/46=73.9% 25/26=96.2% 40/58=69.0%
χ2 = 0.07, p = 0.80, δ95[−0.17, 0.28] χ
2 = 6.11, p = 0.01∗, δ95[0.10, 0.44]
6-len
15/25=60.0% 29/52=55.8% 20/28=71.4% 29/49=59.2%
χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.92, δ95[−0.22, 0.31] χ
2 = 0.69, p = 0.41, δ95[−0.12, 0.37]
PIN
4-len
44/54=81.5% 22/45=48.9% 45/57=78.9% 26/49=53.1%
χ2 = 10.31, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.13, 0.53] χ
2 = 6.86, p = 0.01∗, δ95[0.06, 0.45]
6-len
25/54=46.3% 6/45=13.3% 21/51=41.2% 11/64=17.2%
χ2 = 10.91, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.14, 0.52] χ
2 = 6.98, p = 0.01∗, δ95[0.06, 0.42]
Table 7: Effects on angle on attacker accuracy. The angle is either an observation from the left or right with
a single view (no repeat viewings). For video-based results, no top views were considered. The prior “far”
type angles for each side are reduced to simply, left or right, and only data where screen base resolution
> 1800 was considered. A 2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction was used, and
the χ2 statistic, p-value, and 95% confidence interval (δ95) of the difference between the proportions (live -
video) are reported.
correction) suggest the benefits of removing feedback lines in NPAT is not consistent across studies. While
there are statistical differences between PAT and NPAT in the video study, this effect disappears in the live
study with p = .147 (under the correction). This provides further evidence that removing traceback lines
from pattern entry provides limited protection, and perhaps less than what was previously considered [25].
Despite seeing a reduced benefit from NPAT as compared to PAT, we can confirm H1-p in the live
setting. The authentication type has an impact on shoulder surfing performance as evident in the differences
in attacker success rate for different authentication types, particularly for PINs.
Repeated Viewings (H1-r/H2-p) An important result of the video study was the finding that repeated
viewings have significant impact on attacker performance (H2-p). By expanding our view of Table 6 to the
Two-Same and Two-Different column, we can test for similar effects resulting from repeated viewings. As
before, we observe the most consistency in the PAT and NPAT settings for the live and video study, and
strong differences in the PIN setting. However, where we do see significant difference the confidence interval
suggest that the video study does provide a baseline to the live setting.
We can further directly measure the impact of multiple viewings by performing within collection method
χ2 tests across viewing methods. For PAT, no effect could be identified for multiple views in both the video
and live settings. There is an effect for NPAT in the live (χ2 = 12.0, p < 0.01) but not in the video setting
(χ2 = 5.1, p = 0.08). Post-hoc analysis revealed that, for NPAT in the live setting, having the same viewing
angles twice compared to a single viewing angle or two difference angles drives this difference (p = 0.03,
corrected), suggesting that two-different viewing conditions for NPAT is most advantageous to an attacker.
The case is similar for PINs. In the live setting, a statistically significant difference occurs for conditions of
repeated views (χ2 = 23.1, p = 0.00). However, this was not the case for the video setting (χ2 = 4.1, p = 0.14).
Post-hoc analysis suggests that gaining any repeated viewing, the same angle twice or two different, benefits
the attacker significantly in the live setting. The lack of significance for the video setting may be due to
using this particular subset of video data, but we conjecture that it more likely reflects the high difficulty
of shoulder surfing PINs, generally, which was further exacerbated by the video observation setting without
stereo vision.
Overall, we can confirm H2-p in the live setting, that repeated viewings have an impact on performance.
Where there were previous significant differences in the video study, these persisted in the live setting, except
for NPAT. While there is consistency in viewing the same angle twice, observing the entry from multiple
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angles seems to play a larger role in the live setting compared to the video setting. However, the larger
hypothesis that repeated views impacts performance of shoulder surfing is confirmed.
Observation Angle (H1-r/H4-p) To assess the impact of observation angle, we use only single-view
conditions so as not to conflate the results with the impact of multiple observations. These results are
presented in Table 7 with pairwise comparisons between the live and video study for different passcode
lengths.
While we continue to see significant differences for PIN and a lack thereof for PAT, we see significant
improvements in the live setting for NPAT viewed from the right angle. We conjecture that this improved
attacker performance relates to being able to stereoscopically determine touch locations that are more chal-
lenging to see from the same angle via video simulation. However, depth of touch events continue to be more
challenging when viewed from the left angle. The difference between the observations angles here may also
explain other statistical differences in the previously presented results for NPAT.
However, overall, we do not see significant differences when comparing within a collection method and
authentication when comparing left vs. right angle. This is in conflict with prior work; however, recall that
the top observation angle was removed and the two near and far angles were reduced to a single side angle
(L or R). As the two comparable subsets are consistent, we can confirm that under H4-p the live settings
are well predicted by a comparable subset of video data.
Passcode Properties (H1-r/H5-p) In Table 8, again using single view data, a direct comparison between
each of the passcodes used in the study is displayed, with findings from proportionality tests between the live
and video setting. We find that no significant differences exist for the PAT and NPAT codes, and only three
of the PIN codes show differences. These include the following PINs: 5962, 159428, and 366792 with the live
setting attacker performance being significantly better in each case. The spatial properties of these codes
(see Appendix B.2) does not suggest that a single factor played a role. Although both 5962 and 3669722 are
both right shifted PINs, there are too many other features at play to draw conclusions.
We can perform a within-collection method analysis across the passcodes using a χ2 test, and we find
that significant differences exist for the attacker success rate within both the live and video study, for all
authentication types. However, post-hoc analysis suggest that none of the NPAT pairwise comparisons are
significant, and only one set of PAT pairwise comparisons are significant (743521 vs. 3157) — 743521 was
the most difficult of the patterns to shoulder surf. For PINs in post-hoc analysis, again 159428 and 366792
have significant comparisons, particularly with PINs 7272 and 1955, which were two of the easiest PINs to
shoulder surf in comparison to 159428 and 366792, two of the most difficult to shoulder surf.
Finally, we can compare the impacts of length. For PAT, we do not see significant differences between
success rate for 4- vs. 6-length patterns (χ2 = 2.9, p = 0.09), but we do for the video study (χ2 = 12.83, p <
0.001). We find the reverse for NPAT, where there is a significant difference in length for the live setting
(χ2 = 5.7, p = 0.02) and not for the video study (χ2 = 3.64, p = 0.06). Finally, we see significant differences
for PIN for both live (χ2 = 28.9, p = 0.00) and video (χ2 = 27.6, p = 0.00). This suggests that, yes, the length
of the passcode can have an impact, confirming H1-r for the H5-p condition; however, other properties
of the passcode were not significant, but were so in similar ways between the two studies under the subset
being evaluated.
Hypothesis H1-r Based on the results presented previously, in each case we are able to find confirmation
of each of the previous hypotheses, although, we also find that PINs are the least consistent. This suggests
that researchers should be more skeptical of results related to PIN based authentication in the video setting.
In particular, the true values may be much higher. Additionally, we find strong evidence that the differences
between PAT and NPAT may be greatly dimensioned (although still different) in the live setting.
Hypothesis H2-r We can confirm H2-r that video based recreations do provide a baseline for live simu-
lation. Observe that in all cases where there is significant differences between a video and live measurement
in Tables 6, 7, and 8, the confidence interval suggests that the live setting has higher proportionality than
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Passcode Live Video
P
A
T
0145 8/10=80.0% 23/23=100.0% χ2 = 2.01, p = 0.16, δ95[−0.52, 0.12]
1346 11/11=100.0% 26/28=92.9% χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.92, δ95[−0.09, 0.23]
3157 10/10=100.0% 28/29=96.6% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.07, 0.14]
4572 11/11=100.0% 17/19=89.5% χ2 = 0.13, p = 0.72, δ95[−0.10, 0.32]
6745 10/11=90.9% 12/12=100.0% χ2 = 0.00, p = 0.96, δ95[−0.35, 0.17]
014763 8/10=80.0% 15/19=78.9% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.31, 0.33]
136785 11/11=100.0% 14/17=82.4% χ2 = 0.72, p = 0.40, δ95[−0.08, 0.43]
642580 9/9=100.0% 21/22=95.5% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.09, 0.18]
743521 5/12=41.7% 11/21=52.4% χ2 = 0.05, p = 0.82, δ95[−0.52, 0.31]
841257 12/13=92.3% 13/16=81.2% χ2 = 0.10, p = 0.75, δ95[−0.20, 0.42]
N
P
A
T
0145 10/11=90.9% 12/16=75.0% χ2 = 0.29, p = 0.59, δ95[−0.19, 0.51]
1346 8/10=80.0% 14/18=77.8% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.31, 0.36]
3157 11/11=100.0% 15/21=71.4% χ2 = 2.22, p = 0.14, δ95[0.02, 0.55]
4572 7/10=70.0% 12/25=48.0% χ2 = 0.65, p = 0.42, δ95[−0.19, 0.63]
6745 12/13=92.3% 21/24=87.5% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.20, 0.29]
014763 12/14=85.7% 15/21=71.4% χ2 = 0.33, p = 0.57, δ95[−0.18, 0.47]
136785 5/10=50.0% 7/19=36.8% χ2 = 0.08, p = 0.77, δ95[−0.32, 0.59]
642580 7/9=77.8% 16/26=61.5% χ2 = 0.23, p = 0.63, δ95[−0.24, 0.57]
743521 3/9=33.3% 12/18=66.7% χ2 = 1.52, p = 0.22, δ95[−0.79, 0.13]
841257 8/11=72.7% 8/17=47.1% χ2 = 0.90, p = 0.34, δ95[−0.17, 0.69]
P
IN
1328 15/21=71.4% 16/28=57.1% χ2 = 0.53, p = 0.47, δ95[−0.17, 0.45]
1955 18/21=85.7% 11/19=57.9% χ2 = 2.60, p = 0.11, δ95[−0.04, 0.60]
5962 22/24=91.7% 6/18=33.3% χ2 = 13.23, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.29, 0.88]
6702 15/21=71.4% 6/17=35.3% χ2 = 3.61, p = 0.06, δ95[0.01, 0.71]
7272 19/24=79.2% 9/12=75.0% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.29, 0.38]
1328 15/21=71.4% 16/28=57.1% χ2 = 0.53, p = 0.47, δ95[−0.17, 0.45]
153525 8/24=33.3% 4/13=30.8% χ2 = 0.00, p = 1.00, δ95[−0.31, 0.37]
159428 12/21=57.1% 1/23=4.3% χ2 = 12.27, p = 0.00∗, δ95[0.25, 0.80]
366792 8/21=38.1% 2/26=7.7% χ2 = 4.72, p = 0.03∗, δ95[0.03, 0.58]
441791 10/21=47.6% 5/27=18.5% χ2 = 3.40, p = 0.07, δ95[−0.01, 0.59]
458090 8/18=44.4% 5/20=25.0% χ2 = 0.84, p = 0.36, δ95[−0.16, 0.55]
Table 8: Comparison of attacker accuracy per-passcode. Only single view conditions were considered in both
live and video, and for the video results, only data with resolution > 1800 was included and the “top” angle
was excluded. A 2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction was used, and the χ2
statistic, p-value, and 95% confidence interval (δ95) of the difference between the proportions (live - video)
are reported.
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Figure 4: Grid patterns with crossing and knightmove (4572) features that challenged some observers,
and patterns that were deemed more memorable by some observers because they offered easy symbolic
associations.
that of video setting. In essence, yes, the video study provides a baseline, but the baseline may be much
lower than one may expect, as much as 1.7x.
5.2 Post-Hoc Participant Feedback
One advantage of the live study is that the researchers can directly observe the strategies of the participants
and the relative difficulties encountered, as well as via post hoc questions (the precise questions are found
in the Appendix A.2). There is no direct comparison to the Aviv et al. prior work here, but we believe that
the strategies likely mirror those used by participants in the video study, to some extent.
The most commonly reported strategy for the observation task (n=16) was simply focusing on memorizing
the passcode as it appeared and then, after it was completely entered, writing it down immediately without
delay. Only three participants reported strategies involving writing or physically mirroring the input gesture
while it was happening. Other participants (n=2) described ”chunking” PINs into larger numbers (e.g.
”seventeen” versus ”one-seven”) in their first languages (Farsi and Chinese) to make quick memorization
easier. Five participants mentioned that they watched the readout field in the PIN conditions, while others
preferred to watch only the finger gesture as it was performed.
Participants mentioned several factors that could make PIN and grid passcodes challenging to accurately
record. These included grid pattern shapes that crossed over themselves or contained knightmoves (n=11,
e.g. 743521 and 4572, Figure 4), as well as both long physical jumps between sequential PIN digits (n=3)
and sequential digits physically close together (n=7). Ten participants reported that viewing from the right
was harder because their view of the phone screen was partially blocked by the victim-proctor’s thumb in
his right-handed grip, which is supported in the data, particularly for NPAT results. Six participants also
felt that glare from overhead lighting was sometimes an issue.
Other passcode features and conditions were described as helpful by observers. Four participants men-
tioned that it was easier to memorize shapes that they could easily associate with a visual image, such as
136785 as a house, or 842157 as a picnic table (Figure 4).
Finally, multiple observations of the same passcode were commonly deemed helpful for confirming or
piecing together sequences, although one participant stated that it was easier to do this if both observations
were made from the same side. This is supported by the quantitative data.
6 Implications
Importance of evaluating in appropriate settings Researchers often favor performing studies ex-
amining observational attacks with video-based stimuli presented to participants. While likely simpler to
coordinate and easier to control compared to studies conducted in live settings, video studies can lack realism
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and are considered a methodological substitute only when necessary [27]. While findings from video stud-
ies can be helpful to determine attack rate, our findings suggest that researchers evaluating authentication
interfaces should be aware that there is no substitute for testing in live settings, as the video baseline may
greatly underestimate the threat of an attacker. The video baseline may serve as a method for a preliminary
assessment.
Factors which should be taken into account when performing observational attack studies
While factors such as authentication type and repeated views can impact attack rate, as evidenced through
our study, other factors are worthy of further investigation. Examples include examination of the impact of
observational angle and spatial properties of passcodes and device screen sizes. While significant differences
in some of these factors could not always be detected, subjective feedback gathered from participant observers
suggested that these factors could make a difference to attacker success. Examining these in more detail,
alongside gathering subjective data for purposes of identifying reasoning, is suggested to researchers, as these
may play a greater role than once thought.
Care in selection of passcode Our results suggest that specific types and properties of passcode may be
more susceptible to observational attack, as identified through the comparison with live settings. As a result,
users should be aware that removing the feedback lines from pattern unlock interfaces may not provide the
security benefits that users expect. Secondly, PINs are more susceptible to attack than previously identified
by researchers performing video-based studies. This is also supported in our qualitative feedback where
participants noted that PINs with larger jumps were harder to attack, and for PAT/NPAT, those that are
less “shape like” (e.g. resembling a house-like shape) are harder for participants.
Need for training As our findings have highlighted that observational attacks are more successful under
specific conditions, security training for mobile device users can be developed to better understand the nature
of observational threats, encouraging them to make better security choices. Some users may need to better
understand what methods and parameters would provide resilience against high-probability multiple-view
observation attacks mounted by “insider threats” [28]. Others might want those authentication factors tilted
towards greater ease of use if they perceive less risk of observational attack. Better informing these choices
could come in the form of interactive guidance/prompting when setting-up devices.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have described a study comparing video recreations of shoulder surfing to live simulation.
We recreated a subset of the factors explored in the video study and attempted to confirm prior findings in
this setting. We were able to confirm many of the prior claims regarding the video study, that authentication
type, repeated viewings, observation angle, and passcode properties can affect attacker performance. We
were also able to confirm that video study does form a baseline for the live simulation; however, this
baseline may be much less than desired, as much as 1.9x difference. From these findings we suggest, for
researchers conducting shoulder surfing studies with video components, that data can form a baseline and
be representative, in many situations, of what would occur in a live simulation. However, when possible,
those results should be compared to a live simulation to get a fuller picture of the data and results.
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A Survey Material
A.1 Ante Hoc Demographic Questionnaire
1. What is your age? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, +65, NA)?
2. What is your identified gender?
3. Do you have any physical conditions that might prevent you from observing authentication gestures
performed on a mobile phone?
4. Do you use a smartphone currently? If so, what is its operating system?
5. Why did you select that phone and OS?
6. If you currently use an authentication method to lock your phone, what is the method (i.e. PIN,
TouchID, grid, etc.), and why did you select it?
7. What types of mobile phone authentication have you used? (i.e. PIN, grid pattern, password, finger-
print, face, voice, other)
8. Without telling me your current passcode, how do you select the passcodes you use?
9. How concerned are you with keeping your phone secure (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned)?
10. What experiences can you recall involving people either trying to steal or use your phone without
permission?
11. What experiences can you recall involving people trying to observe your passcodes without permission?
12. How concerned are you with the threat of someone watching you authenticate and collecting your
passcodes (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned)?
13. If you had any of these experiences, how did it affect your behavior?
14. Have any other experiences or concerns affected your authentication?
A.2 Post Hoc Participant Strategies Questionnaire Questions
1. What strategies did you employ to collect the passcodes?
2. Do you have any ideas for additional strategies?
3. How challenging was it to collect PIN passcodes (1, not at all challenging, to 5, very challenging)?
4. How challenging was it to collect grid passcodes (1, not at all challenging, to 5, very challenging)?
5. What features of the passcodes made it easier or more difficult to collect the passcodes you saw?
6. How did the number of views you were given make a difference?
7. How did which side you stood on make any difference?
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A.3 Observation Forms
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A.4 Guide/Script for Administering Study
1. Verify current participant number, exp (1-4, order (a-c). Record this.
2. Introduction - ”Welcome, thanks for participating. Our study deals with the security of different types
of passcodes for mobile phones. Your help today will be pretty straightforward. We will record some
basic demographic information about you. You will observe someone entering in passcodes from a few
feet away, and write down your best guess of what you have seen. We will go over the steps required
to make sure you are comfortable and understand your role. We will record the session to verify the
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results. All data collected will be anonymized for publication. Your part in the study should take
about 20-30 minutes.”
3. Payment - ”The study pays 5 USD.”
4. Observer disclosure - ”Are there any issues, such as corrective glasses or contacts, which might interfere
with performing the role I have described?”
5. IRB Introduction - ”This study has been reviewed by the University’s review board, the IRB, and
approved as safe and ethical. Here is a copy of that form that describes the study that you can read.
Please ask any questions you may have, and sign the form if you would like to participate.”
6. Demographic questionnaire - ”Please fill out the demographic questionnaire.”
7. Training: Overview - ”Here is the process your role as an observer. You will stand to the left or right
behind our researcher, who will sit in the same position entering in passcodes. We will specify where
to stand for each attempt. You will watch each attempt, and then draw on the form we provide your
best guess of the passcode you just saw being entered on the phone. Passcodes may vary in length.
We will repeat this ten times.”
8. Training: Filling out the form diagrams - ”Look at the form we have provided. It has blank PIN
and grid pattern diagrams for you to enter your guesses. For the grid patterns passcodes, draw the
shape you saw entered, and circle the starting point of the shape. For PIN passcodes, write out the
sequence, like ”1234”, and draw the shape you saw entered.” [Demonstrate drawing a diagram, then
allow the participant to practice drawing 2-3 times, based on a practice code for their prescribed
passcode condition (PIN, grid, no-line grid) that you show them slowly, up close, on a phone. Confirm
for grid shapes that they are circling the starting point. Correct any issues that appear, and repeat
until ready.]
9. Training: Taking position for each attempt - ”We will call out a position, LEFT or RIGHT, for you to
stand in for each attempt. Move to the corresponding marker on the floor, figure out which diagram you
are going to fill in, and when set to begin, say ”Ready.” Sometimes, we may also call out MULTIPLE
if you are allowed to view the passcode being entered twice before making your final guess.” ”Any
questions?”
10. Post hoc questionnaire - [Conduct post hoc interview]
B Visualization of Authentication
Below are the set of patterns and PINs as visualized in prior work [4], as well as the description of the visual
properties.
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B.1 Patterns
0145 6745
up down
3157 1346
neutral left
4572 743521
right/cross up/non-adj
136785 642580
down neutral/cross
014673 841257
left right/kmove/cross
B.2 PINs
Note that filled circle is the start point, multiple circles on a number indicate multiple touches.
1328 6702
up/non-adj down/kmove/cross
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1955 7272
neutral/non-adj/repeats left/kmoves/repeats
5962 152525
right up/repat
458090 159428
down/repeat neutral/cross/non-adj
441791 366792
left/kmove/repeat right/repeat/kmove/cross
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